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Abstract
We present a model that is closely related to the so-called models of
choice under complete uncertainty, in which the agent has no informa-
tion about the probability of the outcomes. There are two approaches
within the said models: the state space-based approach, which takes
into account the possible states of nature and the correspondence be-
tween states and outcomes; and the set-based approach, which ignores
such information, and solves certain difficulties arising from the state
space-based approach. Kelsey [?] incorporates into a state space-based
framework the assumption that the agent has ordinal information about
the likelihood of the states. This paper incorporates this same assump-
tion into a set-based framework, thus filling a theoretical gap in the
literature. Compared to the set-based models of choice under complete
uncertainty we introduce the information about the ordinal likelihood
of the outcomes while, compared to Kelsey’s approach, we incorpo-
rate the advantages of describing uncertainty environments from the
set-based perspective. We present an axiomatic study that includes
adaptations of some of the axioms found in the related literature and
we characterize some rules featuring different combinations of infor-
mation about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes and information
about their desirability.
Keywords: Complete Uncertainty, Ordinal Likelihood, Leximax, Leximin.
JEL code: D81.
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1 Introduction
In so-called models of choice under complete uncertainty or ignorance, agents
cannot formulate any kind of belief about the probabilities associated to each
action, or even their relative likelihood. We find two approaches in these
kinds of models. One, the state space-based approach, describes each action
by means of a vector of outcomes contingent upon the possible states of nature.
In this case, complete uncertainty concerns the probability or likelihood of the
states of nature (see Arrow and Hurwicz [?], Maskin [?], Cohen and Jaffray [?],
Barbera` and Jackson [?], and Barrett and Pattanaik [?], among others). The
other, the set-based approach, describes each action exclusively in terms of the
outcomes it might generate. That is, complete uncertainty in this framework
directly concerns the probability or likelihood of the outcomes (see Barbera`
et al. [?], Kannai and Peleg [?], Nitzan and Pattanaik [?], Pattanaik and
Peleg [?], Bossert [?, ?], Bossert et al. [?], Arlegi [?, ?], and, for a survey, see
Barbera` et al. [?]).
The authors of the set-based approach invoke several relative advantages
over the state space-based formulation. One is that the former might be more
suitable for the tractability of overly complex problems, where it might be
difficult, first, to accurately identify the states of nature and, second, to find
the correspondence between states and outcomes. These tasks are sometimes
unnecessary or simply impossible, in which case, only the possible outcomes of
each action are considered. In some situations, moreover, the states of nature
may be arbitrarily partitioned in different ways, making the state space-based
approach subject to this arbitrariness. Finally, the set-based approach has
also been defended as a more suitable way to represent the Rawlsian problem
of choice under the veil of ignorance (a deeper discussion of all these arguments
can be found in Pattanaik and Peleg [?], and Bossert et al. [?]).
In this paper, we model a choice situation with uncertainty where the
decision maker’s beliefs have the structure of an ordinal ranking by likelihood
of the outcomes associated with each action. The consideration of only ordinal
likelihood information in an uncertainty environment is an approach that has
already been made by Kelsey [?] within a state space framework, but the
model we propose adopts the set-based perspective. Thus, while in Kelsey
[?] actions are described by a function that associates outcomes with states
of nature on which a likelihood ordering is defined, each action in our model
3
is described simply by the set of outcomes it might generate, the elements of
which appear ordered from most to least likely. In short, compared to the
set-based models of choice under complete uncertainty we introduce in the
problem the information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes while,
compared to Kelsey’s approach, we incorporate the aforementioned advantages
of describing uncertain environments from the set-based perspective.
Our model also relates to Jaffray’s ([?], [?]) model of choice among be-
lief functions. In fact, our likelihood-ordered sets are special cases of what
Jaffray ([?], [?]) calls imprecise risk situations, i.e., decision problems under
uncertainty where there is some imprecision about the probability of their
consequences, and for which a belief function can be defined. Jaffray ([?], [?])
axiomatically characterizes a generalized expected utility function to compare
such kind of alternatives. However, his model does not apply to our setting,
basically because, while we are interested in a particular class of decision
problems (which we represent by means of likelihood-ordered sets) over which
we assume transitive and complete comparability, Jaffray ([?], [?]) assumes
transitivity and completeness when comparing any pair of belief functions,
thus making a stronger assumption. This affects the applicability of Jaffray’s
model both at the axiomatic level and the results level. In particular, under
complete comparability of any kind of belief functions, he imposes axioms that
imply dealing with linear combinations of belief functions. However, although
likelihood-ordered sets are representable by belief functions, it is not true that
any linear combination of belief functions finds a corresponding representa-
tion as a likelihood-ordered set, making it impossible to fit his axioms into our
framework. Similarly, the generalized expected utility function that he charac-
terizes to evaluate imprecise risk situations uses as support elementary belief
functions, which are a specific kind of belief functions that are also beyond our
domain: they are, too, unrepresentable by means of likelihood-ordered sets.
Methodologically, we present an axiomatic study that includes adaptations
of some axioms from the related literature and investigate their logical impli-
cations in our setting. In particular, we characterize alternative criteria that
combine information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes with infor-
mation about their desirability in different ways. Two of the families of rules
that we characterize, the leximax-desirability rules and the leximin-desirability
rules, are related to other criteria that appear in the literature on complete
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uncertainty, the leximax and leximin rules proposed by Pattanaik and Pe-
leg [?], in the sense that they closely reflect extreme types of optimistic and
pessimistic behavior in the agent, while also incorporating the ordinal likeli-
hood information. We also characterize another family of criteria, namely, the
leximax-likelihood rules, which display a type of behavior in which the agent’s
attention is focused on the most likely outcome of each action. Unlike the
previous two, the leximax-likelihood family has no parallel in the complete
uncertainty literature, but it does in the state-space approach to the ordi-
nal likelihood information problem formulated by Kelsey [?]. Additionally,
we present a family of weighted likelihood criteria, which evaluate actions by
calculating a weighted average of the utilities of all the possible results that
the action may generate, using higher weights for the results perceived by
the agent as most likely. These criteria can naturally be interpreted from a
subjective expected utility perspective.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the basic notation of
the model and presents a preliminary result showing that there is no preorder
over the set of actions that at once satisfies three simple properties. This
result hints that the number of possible outcomes of each action is relevant in
the analysis. This fact will determine the structure of Section 3. In Section
3.1, we restrict the domain to rankings involving only actions with the same
cardinality (equal number of possible outcomes). This enables the character-
ization of some lexicographic criteria. In Section 3.2, we extend these criteria
to the general domain, obtaining some families of rankings. In Section 4, we
present a discussion on the combinations of axioms that appear in the charac-
terization results of Section 3 and, as a consequence, we present new axioms
that characterize the weighted likelihood criteria. We conclude in Section 5
by indicating some possible lines of further research. The Appendix collects
the proofs of all the results presented throughout the paper.
2 A model of ordinal uncertainty and a first
result
Our agent is equipped with a complete preorder, R, defined over an infinite
universal set of outcomes X, which reflects the agent’s preferences over this
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set.1 We will denote by P and I the asymmetric and the symmetric parts of
R, respectively.
We want to derive individual preferences over actions, where an action is a
set of possible final outcomes determined by a chance mechanism. The main
assumption of our model is that the decision maker is only able to assign a
likelihood ranking over the possible outcomes of an action. Thus, actions are
denoted ~a = (a1, . . . , an), where the mutually exclusive outcomes a1, . . . , an
(and no others) are perceived to be the possible final outcomes in decreasing
order of likelihood, that is, ai is perceived to be more likely than aj if i < j.
2
The set of all possible actions includes all non-empty finite ordered subsets of
X, which we denote by Q.
In particular, by considering only ordinal likelihood information, the pos-
sibility is excluded that the agent determines, for example, how much more
likely outcomes are with respect to each other. Moreover, it is also excluded
the possibility that the agent can compare the likelihood of results across dif-
ferent actions. Our model can thus be seen as an intermediate model between
the standard lottery representation and the choice under complete uncertainty.
In the former, an action would also include each outcome’s exact probability
of occurring. In the latter, an action merely describes the set of possible
outcomes with no information about their likelihood or probability.3
We denote by % the individual preference over actions, where we assume
that for all x, y ∈ X, xRy ⇔ (x) % (y). This natural assumption is usu-
ally presented in the literature of choice under complete uncertainty as an
independent axiom under the name of Extension.
Let us discuss the interest and complexity of the problem at hand by in-
troducing a set of basic properties on how to construct individual preferences
over actions. The first property, called Reordering (REO), refers to an intu-
ition already established in Kelsey [?] under the name of Interchange. Assume
that ai and aj are possible outcomes under a certain action ~a. Suppose that
1We will say that a binary relation is a preorder if it satisfies reflexivity and transitivity,
and that it is a complete preorder if it is both a preorder and also satisfies completeness.
2We assume throughout the paper that the likelihood binary relation takes the form of
a linear ordering. The implications of other possible structures are addressed in Section 5.
3Obviously, in the choice under complete uncertainty framework, the order of presenta-
tion is meaningless, and the same action could be represented by any permutation of the
outcomes. In our framework, any permutation of the outcomes within a set would represent
a different action, since it would modify the relative likelihood of the outcomes.
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aj is the better outcome of the two, i.e., ajPai, but it is also the less likely of
the two, i.e., i < j. Then, action Π(i,j)(~a), which simply consists of permuting
the likelihood positions of ai and aj in ~a, has to be perceived as strictly better
than ~a.4
Reordering: For all ~a ∈ Q and i < j,
ajPai ⇒ Π(i,j)(~a)  ~a.
The second property is a plausible adaptation of the Dominance axiom
(DOM) in the set-based approach to choice under complete uncertainty and
is related to Ga¨rdenfors’ principle [?], introduced by Kannai and Peleg [?].
Consider an action ~a and another action with the same possible outcomes as
~a and the same relative likelihood ordering plus an additional outcome x that
is the least likely outcome in this new action. We will represent this action by
(~a, x). Then, the axiom says that, if the new outcome x is strictly better than
all the outcomes of ~a, then action (~a, x) is strictly better than ~a. Similarly,
if x is strictly worse than all the outcomes of ~a, then action (~a, x) is strictly
worse than ~a. Finally, if x is indifferent to all the outcomes of ~a, then (~a, x)
is indifferent to ~a.
Dominance: For all ~a ∈ Q and all x 6∈ ~a:
xPai for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |~a|} ⇒ (~a, x)  ~a.
xIai for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |~a|} ⇒ (~a, x) ∼ ~a.
aiPx for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |~a|} ⇒ ~a  (~a, x).
The last property describes a consistency property on the composition
of actions, along the lines of the independence conditions in the set-based
approach. We will say that the composition of actions ~a and ~c, with ~a∩~c = ∅,
is the action (~a,~c) = (a1, . . . , a|~a|, c1, . . . , c|~c|).5 Such a composition considers
all possible outcomes in ~a and ~c, maintains the internal likelihood orders of the
outcomes of ~a and ~c, and is such that any outcome in ~a is more likely than any
outcome in ~c. Now, suppose that action ~a is strictly better than action ~b, and
similarly, action ~c is strictly better than action ~d. The Composition axiom
(COM) establishes that the composition of ~b and ~d should not be strictly
better than the composition of ~a and ~c.
4Formally, Π(i,j)(~a) = (api(1), . . . , api(|~a|)), where pi is a permutation on {1, . . . , |~a|} such
that pi(i) = j, pi(j) = i, and pi(l) = l for all l 6∈ {i, j}.
5We define the intersection of two ordered sets, ~a and ~b, as the non-ordered set ~a ∩~b =
{x ∈ X | x ∈ ~a and x ∈ ~b}. The union of ordered sets is defined analogously.
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Composition: For all ~a,~b,~c, ~d ∈ Q such that ~a  ~b, ~c  ~d and ~a ∩ ~c =
~b ∩ ~d = ∅,
(~a,~c) % (~b, ~d).
Although the three proposed properties might seem rather natural, they
are, in fact, mutually incompatible, as the following result shows.
Result 1 If there are at least three non-indifferent outcomes in X, there is
no preorder % satisfying REO, DOM and COM.6
When investigating the source of the impossibility addressed by Result
??, we find that COM is controversial when the actions to be compared are
of different cardinality. Consider, as in the statement of the axiom, that ~a is
better than~b and ~c is better than ~d. Imagine, furthermore, that the cardinality
of ~a is greater than that of ~b and that both ~a and ~b are considerably worse
sets of outcomes than either ~c or ~d. Then, the addition of ~c at the end of ~a
and the addition of ~d at the end of ~b both have a positive effect. However,
given that ~a is bigger than ~b, the effect of ~c on ~a is smaller than that of ~d on ~b,
due to the lesser importance of the outcomes of ~c in (~a,~c) in relation to those
of ~d in (~b, ~d). Therefore, (~b, ~d) might become a better action than (~a,~c). In
other words, even though ~a is better than ~b and ~c is better than ~d, the relative
importance of the outcomes of ~c and ~d in (~a,~c) and (~b, ~d) is a crucial aspect.
Clearly, such a relative importance is going to depend on the cardinality of
the involved actions.
Hence, COM makes the implicit assumption that the addition of new out-
comes at the end of an action has similar effects on its desirability, regardless
of the cardinality of the action. However, and with no detriment to our as-
sumption of only ordinal likelihood information within a given action, it makes
sense to recognize that there is information to be deduced from the number
of outcomes in an action. For example, the addition of an outstandingly good
outcome, x, at the end of two actions makes it the least likely to occur in
either case, but it is natural to expect the agent to attach more importance
to x when it is added to a singleton than when it is added to a large set of
outcomes. As a matter of fact, Result ?? highlights this problem by showing
6The result also applies for the case in which X is finite. Additionally, the Extension
assumption over % can also be eliminated without affecting the impossibility.
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that COM is logically incompatible with REO and DOM, which are rather
plausible properties.
This lack of plausibility of COM in the case of unequal cardinality mo-
tivates the direction of the rest of the paper. Throughout the following sec-
tions we will provide independence properties that constitute an alternative
to COM.
3 Lexicographic criteria
In this section, we examine the way in which the combination of an inde-
pendence property that is an alternative to COM with other axioms leads
to characterizations of some lexicographic criteria. These criteria reflect be-
haviors in which the individual focuses on the most likely outcomes, the best
outcomes and the worst outcomes, respectively.
3.1 The equal-cardinality case
Given the apparent relevance of cardinality in comparing actions, we first
study the case in which the agent establishes comparisons only between actions
with an equal number of outcomes. Formally, a preference on equal-cardinality
actions will be a subset of
⋃
k∈N(Qk×Qk), instead of a subset of Q×Q, where
Qk is the set of all ordered subsets of X with cardinality k. In other words,
the agent can compare actions with exactly the same number of outcomes, but
cannot establish any comparison between actions with different cardinalities.
In Section 3.2, we will generalize the preferences derived in this section to the
general domain.
We propose a collection of axioms for the comparison of sets with the same
number of outcomes. We sort them into four categories on the basis of the
ideas they describe: (i) an independence property, (ii) an invariance property
(iii) likelihood sensitivity properties and (iv) outcome sensitivity properties.
Later, we will provide several characterization results by using a combination
of, at most, one property in each of the categories.
An independence property
Independence-like conditions are very common across most of the set-
ranking models, including choice under complete uncertainty problems (see
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Kannai and Peleg [?], or Pattanaik and Peleg [?], among others). Axiom
COM constituted a first crude attempt to reflect this idea. In this section,
we propose a property for the case of equal-cardinality comparisons. Inde-
pendence (IND) is a translation to our framework of Savage’s [?] Sure-Thing
Principle in line with Kelsey [?]: Consider two actions, ~a and ~b, and a further
two new actions that have the same possible outcomes as ~a and~b, respectively,
while also maintaining the original relative likelihood ordering of these out-
comes. Assume, furthermore, that the new actions have one extra outcome
each, x and y, that are mutually indifferent and occupy the same position in
the likelihood ordering. Axiom IND says that the two new actions should be
compared in the same way as ~a and ~b. Formally,
Independence: For all k ∈ N, all ~a,~b ∈ Qk, all x 6∈ ~a, y 6∈ ~b such that
xIy, and all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k + 1},
~a % ~b⇔ (a1, . . . , am−1, x, am, . . . , ak) % (b1, . . . , bm−1, y, bm, . . . , bk).7
An invariance property
Neutrality (NEU) is a natural adaptation to our informational framework
of an axiom with the same name that appears in the literature of choice under
complete uncertainty (see Bossert [?], Nitzan and Pattanaik [?] and Pattanaik
and Peleg [?], among others), and also of the Independence of Ranking of
Irrelevant Outcomes property in Kelsey [?]. In words, NEU implies that the
criterion % should be immune to changes with no effect either on the likelihood
ordering of the outcomes within each action or on the desirability ordering of
all the outcomes of the two actions to be compared. In particular, NEU
implies that the criterion to be constructed disregards any kind of cardinal
information in the agent’s preferences. NEU therefore has a more natural
interpretation in a context where the decision-maker is a social planner who
has access only to ordinal information about individual’s preferences over the
consequences.
Neutrality: For all k ∈ N, all ~a,~b ∈ Qk and all one-to-one mappings
f : X → X such that for all x, y ∈ (~a ∪~b), xRy ⇔ f(x)Rf(y),
~a % ~b⇔ (f(a1), . . . , f(ak)) % (f(b1), . . . , f(bk)).
7Obviously, when m = 1, the results am−1 and bm−1 do not exist and the two ordered
sets start with outcomes x and y. Similarly, when m = k+ 1, the two ordered sets end with
outcomes x and y.
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Likelihood sensitivity properties
The consideration of likelihood information is the new feature that differ-
entiates this analysis from the previous literature on choice under complete
uncertainty. REO reflects a basic idea about how likelihood information can
be considered. The following property, called Likelihood Sensitivity (LS), en-
compasses the idea of the sensitivity of the ranking % with respect to the
likelihood information. To introduce this property, let us consider two ac-
tions with the same cardinality, ~a and ~b, such that action ~a is strictly better
than action ~b. Furthermore, let us consider two new outcomes, x and y. The
property states that we can always find an action ~c such that the composite
action (~a,~c, x) is preferred to (~b,~c, y), regardless of the difference in desirabil-
ity between x and y. The real scope of the axiom arises when yPx. Then, LS
establishes that we can reduce the relative likelihood of outcomes x and y by
a degree sufficient to maintain the original preference for ~a over ~b. This axiom
is specific to our framework and has no direct links with any axiom from the
literature on choice under complete uncertainty.
Likelihood Sensitivity: For all k ∈ N, all ~a,~b ∈ Qk such that ¬(aiIbi)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and all x 6∈ ~a, y 6∈ ~b, there exists ~c ∈ Q such that
~a  ~b⇒ (~a,~c, x)  (~b,~c, y).
We now introduce two weaker versions of LS, called Weak Likelihood Sen-
sitivity 1 (WLS1) and Weak Likelihood Sensitivity 2 (WLS2). They also
reflect related ideas of “robustness” of the strict preference relation between
actions. WLS1 (respectively, WLS2) requires the new outcomes x and y to
be no better (respectively, worse) than the best (respectively, worst) outcome
in the original actions, thus making the argument in LS more plausible. In
order to formulate these axioms we need to introduce an additional piece of
notation: for all finite C ⊂ X, max{C} = {x ∈ C | xRy for all y ∈ C} and
min{C} = {x ∈ C | yRx for all y ∈ C}. With a slight abuse of notation,
we define the max and min operators for the elements of Q in the same way.
That is, max{~a} (min{~a}) represents the subset of best (worst) outcomes in
~a.8
8Given that all elements of the best (worst) outcomes of a set belong to the same
indifference class according to R, we will apply, with a slight abuse of notation, this binary
relation to these sets also.
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Weak Likelihood Sensitivity 1: For all k ∈ N, all ~a,~b ∈ Qk such
that ¬(aiIbi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and all x 6∈ ~a, y 6∈ ~b such that max{~a ∪
~b}Rmax{x, y}, there exists ~c ∈ Q such that
~a  ~b⇒ (~a,~c, x)  (~b,~c, y).
Weak Likelihood Sensitivity 2: For all k ∈ N, all ~a,~b ∈ Qk such that
¬(aiIbi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and all x 6∈ ~a, y 6∈ ~b such that min{x, y}Rmin{~a∪
~b}, there exists ~c ∈ Q such that
~a  ~b⇒ (~a,~c, x)  (~b,~c, y).
Outcome sensitivity properties
The Extension assumption made in this model implies that the desirability
of the outcomes matters when comparing elementary actions. We now discuss
two properties related to the sensitivity of the preferences towards the desir-
ability of the outcomes that go beyond such a basic assumption as Extension.
These properties, called High Outcome Sensitivity (HOS) and Low Outcome
Sensitivity (LOS), reflect the idea that there always exist outcomes that are
sufficiently good or bad as to reverse a given preference over two actions. To
see the implications of HOS, consider two actions, ~a and ~b, and suppose that
~b is better than ~a. Then, construct another new action that has the same
outcomes as ~a, except the least likely one, with the same likelihood ordering.
Then, HOS states that it is always possible to find a sufficiently good outcome,
y, that, when taking last place in the likelihood ordering, will make the new
action better than ~b. The intuitive idea is that we can always compensate for
the difference in the preference between ~a and ~b with an outcome, x, provided
it is sufficiently good. LOS is a dual property, which establishes that it is
possible for a sufficiently bad outcome to compensate for a difference in the
preference between two actions. The purpose of these properties is to estab-
lish that the criterion % should be sensitive to the utilities of the outcomes.
These properties are also specific to our framework.
High Outcome Sensitivity: For all k ∈ N and all ~a,~b ∈ Qk such that
there exists x ∈ X with xPz for any z ∈ (~a ∪~b), there exists y 6∈ (~a ∪~b) such
that
(a1, . . . , ak−1, y)  ~b.
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Low Outcome Sensitivity: For all k ∈ N and all ~a,~b ∈ Qk such that
there exists x ∈ X with zPx for any z ∈ (~a ∪~b), there exists y 6∈ (~a ∪~b) such
that
~b  (a1, . . . , ak−1, y).
We have presented four classes of axioms for ranking actions of the same
cardinality. We now present characterization results for the equal-cardinality
case in which we always make use of the new independence property (IND).
In our first result, we will show the great strength of LS when combined
with IND so that it determines a very particular way of ranking actions.
The combination of these two properties is strong enough to: (i) imply an
invariance property like NEU, and (ii) be incompatible with any of the above
proposed outcome sensitivity properties.
Theorem 1 A reflexive binary relation %⊆ ⋃k∈N(Qk×Qk) satisfies IND and
LS if, and only if, for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N:
~a % ~b⇔ there is not j ≤ k such that biIai for all i < j and bjPaj.
Theorem ??, in fact, characterizes what we will call the leximax-likelihood
rule, %LL, which proceeds as follows: the agent first looks at the most likely
outcome in each action. If one of them is strictly better than the other, then
the action with the better most likely outcome is declared strictly preferred.
In the event of a tie, the agent looks at the second most likely outcome in ~a and
~b respectively and proceeds analogously. If ties occur successively until both
sets are exhausted, they are then declared indifferent. Clearly, this criterion
leaves no room for outcome sensitivity properties.
Next, we explore the consequences of weakening LS by means of WLS1
and WLS2. As the next two results show, this will allow for some outcome
sensitivity (in the form of HOS and LOS). In order to present the theorems,
we need some additional notation. For all ~a ∈ Qk, γ(~a) (respectively, β(~a))
will denote the permutation of the outcomes in ~a such that γi(~a)Rγi+1(~a)
(respectively, βi+1(~a)Rβi(~a)) for all i < k and, in case of indifference, the most
likely outcome occupies a previous (lower) position after the permutation,
where γi(~a) (respectively, βi(~a)) denotes the element of ~a that occupies the
i-th position after the permutation. That is, γ (respectively, β) reorders the
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elements of an action from best to worst (respectively, worst to best), in
terms of the preferability of the outcomes, while preserving, in the event of
indifference, their relative positions in terms of their likelihood.
Furthermore, L(γi(~a)) will denote the position in likelihood terms that
element γi(~a) occupies in ~a. That is, L(γi(~a)) = s if γi(~a) = as. The position
L(βi(~a)) is defined analogously.
Theorem 2 A preorder %⊆ ⋃k∈N(Qk ×Qk) satisfies IND, NEU, WLS1 and
HOS if, and only if, for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N:
~a % ~b⇔ there is not j ≤ k such that:
for all i < j,
[
γi(~b)Iγi(~a) and L(γi(~b)) = L(γi(~a))
]
and[
γj(~b)Pγj(~a) or
(
γj(~b)Iγj(~a) and L(γj(~b)) < L(γj(~a))
)]
.
Theorem ?? characterizes what we will call the leximax-desirability rule,
%LD, which starts by looking, respectively, at the best outcome in each action
(if the best outcome is not unique, the criterion focuses on the most likely of
these outcomes). If there is a strict preference for one of the outcomes over
the other then the action that contains the former is declared strictly better.
In the event of indifference between the two outcomes, the rule proceeds to
look at their positions in likelihood terms and declares a strict preference for
the action whose best outcome takes a lower likelihood position. Only in the
event that the respective best outcomes take the same likelihood positions the
criterion proceeds to look, respectively, at the best remaining outcome of each
action (with the same tie-breaking rule) and proceeds as previously.
Theorem 3 A preorder %⊆ ⋃k∈N(Qk ×Qk) satisfies IND, NEU, WLS2 and
LOS if, and only if, for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N:
~a % ~b⇔ there is not j ≤ k such that:
for all i < j,
[
βi(~b)Iβi(~a) and L(βi(~b)) = L(βi(~a))
]
and[
βj(~b)Pβj(~a) or
(
βj(~b)Iβj(~a) and L(βj(~b)) > L(βj(~a))
)]
.
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Theorem ?? characterizes what we will call the leximin-desirability rule,
%ld, which is, in a sense, dual with respect to %LD. The rule looks at the
respective worst outcome in each set (if the worst outcome is not unique, the
criterion focuses on the most likely of these outcomes). The set where the
worst outcome is better is declared preferred, and in the event of indifference,
the rule selects the action in which the worst outcome occupies a less likely
position. If the two outcomes occupy the same likelihood position in their
sets, then the rule looks at next worst outcome of each action (with the same
tie-breaking rule) and proceeds as previously described.
The three rules characterized above are related to other lexicographic rules
in Pattanaik and Peleg [?] within the set-based approach to problems of choice
under complete uncertainty, and in Kelsey [?] within the state space-based
approach to our problem. The leximax-desirability rule and the leximin-
desirability rule reflect, respectively, optimistic and pessimistic attitudes of
the agent. Under the former, the agent focuses on the best possible outcome
of each action, while, under the latter, the agent tries to maximize the worst
possible outcome. In contrast with the leximax and leximin rules in Pattanaik
and Peleg [?], our rules assign a relevant role to likelihood information. While
in the complete uncertainty case, the leximax (respectively, leximin) rule pro-
ceeds to consider the second best (respectively, worst) outcome of each action
in the event of indifference between the best (respectively, worst) ones, in our
context, the rule takes into account information about the relative likelihood
of the best (respectively, worst) outcomes. Only if they are also equivalent
in terms of their likelihood, the rule proceeds to consider the second best
(respectively, worst) outcome.
Likelihood information plays a more important role in the leximax-likelihood
rule, where the agent focuses her attention on the most likely outcome of each
action, and it does not appear to matter whether the agent’s attitude is pes-
simistic or optimistic. This rule has the same spirit as the lex-likelihood rule
of Kelsey [?], which evaluates primarily the outcomes that arise in the most
likely state of nature. Both rules also proceed in a similar fashion in the event
of this first comparison between two actions being inconclusive: that is, look-
ing at the second most likely outcome of each action in the case of our rule,
and at the respective outcomes that arise in the second most likely state of
nature in Kelsey’s case.
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We additionally show that the axioms used in each of the previous theorems
are independent.
Proposition 1 The following collections of axioms are independent:
1. IND and LS.
2. IND, NEU, WLS1 and HOS.
3. IND, NEU, WLS2 and LOS.
3.2 The general case
We now generalize the criteria characterized in Section 3.1 to the general case
in which actions may have different cardinality. We will approach the problem
solely by adding DOM, which is rather plausible in the general case, to the
axioms used in the above characterization theorems. We will also add a tech-
nical condition of richness of the domain X, which states that, for all x, y ∈ X
such that xPy, there exist a, b, c ∈ X such that aPxPbPyPc. That is, in a
rich domain, for any two outcomes, there is always another that is better,
another that is worse, and another that is between the two. In rich domains,
the addition of DOM provides extensions of the rules characterized in Section
3.1, in the sense that they compare actions having the same cardinality as
their respective particularizations, while also establishing certain comparisons
between actions having different cardinality.9
We will first introduce some families of rules that extend each of the lexico-
graphic criteria characterized in the previous section.
Definition 1 A preorder %⊆ Q×Q belongs to the family of extended leximax-
likelihood rules, %∈%eLL, if % extends %LL and, for all ~a,~b ∈ Q such that
|~a| < |~b|:
• If (b1, . . . , b|~a|) LL ~a or [(b1, . . . , b|~a|) ∼LL ~a and bjPbi for all j > |~a|
and i ≤ |~a|]}, then ~b  ~a.
• If ~a LL (b1, . . . , b|~a|) or [~a ∼LL (b1, . . . , b|~a|) and biPbj for all i ≤ |~a|
and j > |~a|], then ~a  ~b.
9Formally, a preference over actions %⊆ Q×Q extends a preference on equal-cardinality
actions %∗⊆ ⋃k∈N(Qk ×Qk) if for all ~a,~b such that |~a| = |~b|, ~a % ~b⇔ ~a %∗ ~b.
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• If aiIbj for all i, j ≤ |~a| and γ1(~b)Pβ1(~b)Iγ1(~a), then ~b  ~a.
• If aiIbj for all i, j ≤ |~a| and γ1(~a)Iγ1(~b)Pβ1(~b), then ~a  ~b.
• If aiIbj for all ai ∈ ~a, bj ∈ ~b, then ~a ∼ ~b.
The extended leximax-likelihood rules coincide with the leximax-likelihood
rule when the actions to be compared have the same cardinality. When the
cardinality of the actions is different, the extended leximax-likelihood rules
proceed as follows: they select the first (more likely) outcomes of the action
with the greater cardinality, such as to form a subset (another action) con-
taining the same number of outcomes as in the other set. Then, the extended
leximax-likelihood rules compare these sets by the leximax-likelihood rule. If
there is a strict preference, they replicate what is established by the leximax-
likelihood rule. Otherwise, if the two selected sets are indifferent, they look at
the remaining (less likely) outcomes of the larger set. If all of these are weakly
better than all the preceding outcomes with at least one strict inequality,
then the action with the larger set of outcomes is declared the better of the
two. If they are weakly worse with at least one strict inequality, the action
with the smaller set of outcomes is the better of the two. If all the outcomes
are indifferent, then the two actions are indifferent. The remaining possible
comparisons are not univocally determined, which is what distinguishes the
different members of the family of extended leximax-likelihood rules.
Definition 2 A preorder %⊆ Q×Q belongs to the family of extended leximax-
desirability rules, %∈%eLD, if % extends %LD and, for all ~a,~b ∈ Q such that
|~a| < |~b|:
• If {γ1(~b)Pγ1(~a) or β1(~b)Iγ1(~a)Pβ1(~a)}, then ~b  ~a.
• If there is j ≤ |~a| such that:
for all i < j,
[
γi(~a)Iγi(~b) and L(γi(~a)) = L(γi(~b))
]
and
[
γj(~a)Pγj(~b) or
(
γj(~a)Iγj(~b) and L(γj(~a)) < L(γj(~b))
)]
,
then ~a  ~b.
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• If aiIbi for all i ≤ |~a| and {β1(~a)Pγ|~a|+1(~b) or γ1(~a)Iβ1(~a)Iγ1(~b) Pβ1(~b)},
then ~a  ~b.
• If aiIbj for all ai ∈ ~a, bj ∈ ~b, then ~a ∼ ~b.
The extended leximax-desirability rules coincide with the leximax-desirability
rule when the actions to be compared have the same cardinality. When the
actions to be compared have different cardinality, the intersection of all the
extended leximax-desirability rules does not treat them symmetrically. In or-
der to establish a preference for the smaller set, ~a, it follows a lexicographic
procedure parallel to the leximax-desirability rule. If this lexicographic pro-
cedure leads to an indifference between ~a and (b1, . . . , b|~a|), then ~a is preferred
when (i): the remaining outcomes of ~b are strictly worse or (ii): they are
weakly worse with at least one strict inequality and all the outcomes of ~a are
indifferent. The conditions to ensure that a strict preference for the larger set
is declared by every rule in the family are more demanding, however. They
require either: (i): that the best outcome of the larger action is strictly better
than the best outcome of the smaller one or (ii): that all the outcomes of the
larger action are weakly better than all the outcomes of the smaller one, with
at least one strict preference. The intuition behind these more demanding
conditions is that, when the best outcomes of the two sets are indifferent and
occupy the same likelihood position, this same likelihood position appears to
hold more weight when the number of outcomes is smaller. If all the outcomes
of the two actions are indifferent, then the two actions are declared indiffer-
ent. In all other cases, comparisons are not univocally determined by all the
members of the family.
Definition 3 A preorder %⊆ Q×Q belongs to the family of extended leximin-
desirability rules, %∈%eld, if % extends %ld and, for all ~a,~b ∈ Q such that
|~a| < |~b|:
• If β1(~a)Pβ1(~b) or γ1(~a)Pβ1(~a)Iγ1(~b), then ~a  ~b.
• If there is j ≤ |~a| such that:
for all i < j,
[
βi(~b)Iβi(~a) and L(βi(~b)) = L(βi(~a))
]
and
[
βj(~b)Pβj(~a) or
(
βj(~b)Iβj(~a) and L(βj(~b)) > L(βj(~a))
)]
,
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then ~b  ~a.
• If aiIbi for all i ≤ |~a| and {β|~a|+1(~b)Pγ1(~a) or γ1(~b)Pβ1(~b)Iγ1(~a)Iβ1(~a)},
then ~b  ~a.
• If aiIbj for all ai ∈ ~a, bj ∈ ~b then ~a ∼ ~b.
Again, the extended leximin-desirability rules coincide with the leximin-desirability
rule when the actions to be compared have the same cardinality. Otherwise,
they follow a comparison process that is dual to that of the extended leximax-
desirability rules. In particular, a preference for the action with the smaller
number of outcomes is now established unanimously by every rule in the family
only if its worst outcome is better than the worst outcome of the other action
or when all the outcomes of the smaller action are weakly better than all those
of the larger one. In turn, in order to ensure a unanimous preference for the
action with the larger number of outcomes, the extended leximin-desirability
rules apply the leximin-desirability procedure in a way analogous to that in
which extended leximax-desirability rules apply the leximax-desirability pro-
cedure to establish a preference for the action with the smaller number of
outcomes.
The above extensions can be identified by making use of the axiomatic
battery from Section 3 and the additional assumptions of DOM and richness
of the domain.10
Theorem 4 Let X be rich. Then, a preorder %⊆ Q × Q satisfies IND, LS
and DOM if, and only if, %∈%eLL.
Theorem 5 Let X be rich. Then, a preorder %⊆ Q×Q satisfies IND, NEU,
WLS1, HOS and DOM if, and only if, %∈%eLD.
Theorem 6 Let X be rich. Then, a preorder %⊆ Q×Q satisfies IND, NEU,
WLS2, LOS and DOM if, and only if, %∈%eld.
Remark 1 Kannai and Peleg [?] proved the impossibility of combining cer-
tain ideas of Dominance and Independence in the set-based approach to choice
10Although one might think these families of rules are empty due to intransitivities, this
is not the case, as shown by the examples included in the Appendix, where we present
examples of rules from each of the families.
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under complete uncertainty (ranking sets of outcomes with no likelihood infor-
mation) when X has at least six non-indifferent outcomes. Also, Bossert [?]
and Barbera` et al. [?] proved that, when adding Neutrality to the said ideas of
Dominance and Independence, the impossibility holds for any domain X with
at least four non-indifferent outcomes. A remarkable feature of Theorems ??,
?? and ?? is that, if we admit ordinal likelihood information, our proposed
adaptations of the ideas of Dominance, Independence and Neutrality (axioms
DOM, IND and NEU) become compatible, even in an infinite domain.
4 Weighted likelihood criteria
The results of Theorems ?? to ?? contribute towards a discussion of the pro-
posed lexicographic rules based on their axiomatic structure.11 %LL is charac-
terized in Theorem ?? by the combination of IND and LS. However, IND and
LS seem to appeal to logically incompatible ideas. LS appeals to the intuitive
idea that the relative likelihood of one outcome of an action with respect to
another depends on the number of places between them in the likelihood or-
dering. Meanwhile, IND argues that the deletion of the same outcome of two
actions, when their position is the same, makes no difference to the comparison
between the actions, which is an implicit assumption that there is no infor-
mation to be gained from the number of places (in the likelihood ordering)
separating two outcomes of an action. Thus, what Theorem 1 makes clear to
us is that there is a way of making the two conditions compatible, but that it
forces the rule to proceed lexicographically in the manner of %LL.12
Axioms IND and LS are not the only ones introducing strong logical ten-
sion into the characterization results. IND also conflicts indirectly with NEU
because their combination leads to the strong conclusion that there is no pos-
sible trade-off between the desirability of the outcomes and their likelihood
positions. To see this, let a, b, c, d, e ∈ X be such that aPbPcPdPe. Then,
observe that, by IND, we have that (b, c)  (b, d) and, by NEU, we have that
(a, e) ∼ (b, d) ⇔ (a, e) ∼ (b, c). These two facts, together with transitivity,
imply that it is not possible for a criterion satisfying IND and NEU to estab-
lish that (a, e) ∼ (b, d). This is a quite plausible comparison that is precluded
11We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this discussion.
12The same applies to the combination of IND and the weaker versions of LS used in
Theorems ?? and ??.
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by rules such as %LD and %ld, which, as shown in Theorems ?? and ??, are
characterized by the combination of these axioms.13
In sum, IND seems to be at the center of many axiomatic tensions. Next,
we proceed by relaxing IND to the following implied property, which we call
Responsiveness (RES): Consider two actions ~a and ~b such that both share
(k−1) possible outcomes with the same relative likelihood ordering. The only
difference is that ~a and ~b may each generate an additional outcome (aj and
bj, respectively) at the same relative likelihood position. Then, RES states
that the preferred action is the one where the different outcome is better.
RES is related to the Dominance properties in Kelsey’s [?] state space-based
framework.
Responsiveness: For all j, k ∈ N such that j ≤ k, and all ~a,~b ∈ Qk such
that ai = bi for all i ∈ ({1, . . . , k} \ {j}),
ajRbj ⇔ ~a % ~b.
According to the above discussion, the weakening of IND to RES allevi-
ates the tension with LS, but not with NEU. Therefore, besides relaxing the
independence property IND to RES, in this section we proceed by replacing
NEU with a new invariance property called Reversal of Order (RO). As we
will observe, this replacement allows for cardinal information to be embedded
in the preference ranking. The new property is inspired by another of the
same name that appears in the Anscombe-Aumann subjective expected util-
ity model (see Anscombe and Aumann [?] and Hammond [?]). Intuitively, the
property states that, if the outcome the agent receives is to be determined by
both an uncertain situation and a risk situation, then it is irrelevant whether
the risk is faced before or after the uncertainty. A formal definition requires
the extension of our model to cover risk situations.
We denote a standard risk situation (i.e., lottery) by [p1, x1; p
2, x2; . . . ; p
k, xk],
where pi specifies the objective probability of outcome xi. In a similar fashion,
we can define lotteries in which probabilities are associated to actions rather
than outcomes. A lottery over actions is denoted by [p1,~a1; p2,~a2; . . . ; pk,~ak].
In this general model, we must also consider actions in which the ordinal
likelihood relation applies not to final outcomes but to lotteries. We denote
13This fact is not exclusive to our characterizations. Something similar happens with
Pattanaik and Peleg’s [?] characterization of the leximin criterion for the case of complete
uncertainty.
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such general actions by ([p1,~a1; p2,~a2; . . . ; pk,~ak], . . . , [q1,~b1; q2,~b2; . . . ; ql,~bl]).
In this extended model, a preference must compare not only uncertainty situa-
tions (i.e., actions) but also lotteries, and more generally lotteries over actions
and actions over lotteries. For the sake of simplicity, we will maintain the
same notation for the preference relation defined on this extended domain.
Reversal of Order: For all k,m ∈ N, for all probability distribution
(p1, . . . , pm) and all ~a1, . . . , ~am ∈ Qk,
[p1, ~a1; . . . ; pm, ~am] ∼ ([p1, a11; . . . , pm, am1 ], . . . , [p1, amk ; . . . ; pm, amk ]).
Finally, we assume that the agent satisfies the standard Expected Utility
assumptions on lotteries on outcomes. We call this the Expected Utility (EU)
axiom.
Expected Utility: % satisfies the Expected Utility assumptions on lot-
teries on final outcomes.
An additional piece of notation will be useful for formulating our next
result. Take any cardinality, k ∈ N, of actions, any s ∈ {1, . . . , k} and any
T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}. Then, we define T−s = {j ∈ T, j < s}, T+s = {j ∈ T, j ≥ s}
and T ∗+s = {j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1}, j = p+ 1, with p ∈ T+s}.
T represents any subset of positions of actions of dimension k, T−s and T+s
represent the respective subsets of the positions in T which are lower (resp.
higher) than a given position s, and T ∗+s represents a set consisting of the
positions of T+s increased in one unit.
We are now ready to introduce the characterization theorem of the fam-
ily of weighted likelihood criteria, where actions are evaluated by a weighted
average of the utilities of their outcomes according to weights that decrease
with the likelihood positions.14
Theorem 7 Let X be rich such that all indifference classes are infinite and
assume that RO and EU hold. Then, a complete preorder %⊆ Q×Q satisfies
RES, REO and DOM if, and only if, there exists u : X → R and for all
k ∈ N, there exists ωk = (ωk1 , . . . , ωkk) ∈ Rk++ such that (i) ωki > ωki+1 for
14The family of weighted likelihood criteria can, alternatively, be characterized by axioms
that deal only with uncertain actions, but Theorem ?? allows us to obtain the character-
ization on the basis of more primitive assumptions. We thank an anonymous referee for
guiding us in this direction.
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all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, (ii)
k∑
i=1
ωki = 1, (iii)
∑
i∈T
ωki ≤
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i for all
s ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, such that:
for all ~a,~b ∈ Q, ~a % ~b⇔
|~a|∑
i=1
ω
|~a|
i · u(ai) ≥
|~b|∑
i=1
ω
|~b|
i · u(bi).
The weighted likelihood criteria compare actions with the same cardinality
in a subjective expected utility manner. However, when comparing actions with
different cardinality, it is necessary to determine a vector of weights for each
cardinality value. In this case, the axioms imply that, when a new better
outcome is inserted into an action, the distribution function for the random
utility associated with the new action first order stochastically dominates the
distribution function for the random utility associated with the given action.
Formally, this is expressed by condition (iii), which imposes restrictions on the
way weights can vary across different cardinality values, as follows: Consider
any action, ~a ∈ Qk, for any k ∈ N. The sum of the weights of any subset
of outcomes of ~a that occupy a set of positions T should be lower than the
sum of the weights of this set of outcomes and the weight of a new outcome
that has been inserted into any s-th position of this action. For example,
for k = 5, if we consider T = {1, 4, 5} and s = 4, the restriction says that
ω51 + ω
5
4 + ω
5
5 ≤ ω61 + ω64 + ω65 + ω66.15
5 Conclusions and further research
We have proposed a new formal framework for the analysis of problems of
choice under uncertainty in environments where the decision-maker is unable
to establish a complete probability distribution among the outcomes of each
action, but is able to rank them in terms of their likelihood. We first show that
the comparison of actions having different cardinality poses more difficulties
than the comparison of actions having equal cardinality. We therefore begin by
analyzing the equal-cardinality case, characterizing different rules by imposing
intuitive adaptations to our framework of axioms from the related literature.
These rules compare actions lexicographically, maintaining the spirit of other
15As in Theorems ??, ?? and ??, one might think that the weighted likelihood family is
empty, in this case due to the incompatibility of all the restrictions imposed on the weights.
Again, we show in the Appendix that this is, in fact, not the case.
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lexicographic rules proposed in the related literature. Taking these results
as a reference, we explore the different-cardinality case by simply introducing
the Dominance axiom, thus obtaining the characterization of three families
that extend the respective rules of the equal-cardinality case to the general
case. Additionally, we characterize a family of rules that evaluate actions by
a weighted utility of the possible outcomes, in which the weights retain the
ordinal likelihood ordering perceived by the individual.
Regarding further research, it would be of interest to investigate whether
additional plausible conditions might constrain the families characterized in
the paper. Another line of research would be to relax the linearity assump-
tion about the likelihood relation among the outcomes within each action. It
could be the case that certain pairs of possible outcomes within an action are
perceived by the agent as being equally likely, in which case the likelihood
relation among the outcomes should admit indifferences. It appears that this
would affect the model in a nontrivial way, right from the notational stage,
because actions could then no longer be described as ordered sets.
As a matter of fact, from a bounded rationality-like perspective, it would be
reasonable to relax even further the structure of the binary likelihood relation
among the outcomes within each action. A very appealing line of research
would be to analyze the consequences of assuming that the likelihood relation
is, for example, no more than an interval order, a semi-order, or a partial
order.
It is also worth noting that, in our framework, the agent is able to establish
comparisons of relative likelihood between consequences of the same action,
but not across outcomes that are consequences of different actions.16 For
example, our framework does not allow us to determine whether an outcome
x under action A is more or less likely than outcome y under action B. There
are numerous situations in which ordinal comparisons of this kind are part of
the decision-maker’s input of the problem. Consideration of this possibility
would constitute a very reasonable extension of our model. An adequate
development of this issue is sufficiently complicated as to be beyond the scope
of this paper.
16We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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Appendix
Here we show the proofs of the theorems. We begin with a lemma that will
be useful in the proofs of the results.
Lemma 1 Let % be a binary relation on Q. Then, the following statements
hold:
1. If % satisfies IND and WLS1, then it also satisfies REO.
2. If % satisfies IND and WLS2, then it also satisfies REO.
Proof: We will prove both statements using the same reasoning. Let %⊆
(Q×Q) satisfying IND and WLS1 (or WLS2), and ~a ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N such
that ajPai, with j > i. Note that Π(i,j)(~a) and ~a have the same outcomes in
each position, except for positions i and j. Then, we apply IND (k− 2)-times
obtaining
~a % Π(i,j)(~a)⇔ (ai, aj) % (aj, ai)
Π(i,j)(~a) % ~a⇔ (aj, ai) % (ai, aj)
Given that (aj)  (ai), the application of WLS1 (or WLS2) implies that
there exists ~c ∈ Q such that (aj,~c, ai)  (ai,~c, aj). Now, applying IND |~c|-
times, we obtain that (aj, ai)  (ai, aj). Consequently, Π(i,j)(~a)  ~a and %
satisfies REO. 
Proof of Result ??
Let x, y, z ∈ X be such that xPyPz, and consider the set ~a = (x, z, y). Then,
if we apply the permutation Π(2,3) to ~a, we obtain the set Π(2,3)(~a) = (x, y, z).
Given that yPz, by REO we have that (x, y, z)  (x, z, y). Furthermore, by
DOM we can conclude that (x)  (x, y) and (z, y)  (z). Applying COM,
we have that (x, z, y) % (x, y, z), and by transitivity, (x, y, z)  (x, y, z), thus
contradicting reflexivity.
Proof of Theorem ??
The necessary part can easily be checked. To prove the sufficient part, take
~a,~b ∈ Qk. If aiIbi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then, by the Extension assumption on
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% we have that (a1) ∼ (b1). Then, by successive applications of IND we obtain
~a ∼ ~b. Otherwise, we can assume, by IND, that ¬(aiIbi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and we need to prove that ~a  ~b whenever a1Pb1. We will proceed by induction
on k. Let us start with k = 1. Suppose, without loss of generality, that a1Pb1.
Then, by the Extension assumption, we have that (a1)  (b1) and it is proved
for k = 1. Now, we will suppose that the statement is true for k = t and
we will prove the case k = t + 1. We have, by the induction hypothesis, that
(a1, . . . , at)  (b1, . . . , bt) when a1Pb1. Then, LS says that there exists ~c ∈ Q
such that (a1, . . . , at,~c, at+1)  (b1, . . . , bt,~c, bt+1). Applying IND |~c|-times, we
obtain that ~a  ~b, thus proving the result. Therefore, %=%LL.
Proof of Theorem ??
The necessary part is straightforward. To prove the sufficient part, take ~a,~b ∈
Qk. If aiIbi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then, by the Extension assumption on
% we have that (a1) ∼ (b1). Then, by successive applications of IND we
obtain ~a ∼ ~b. In other case, we can assume, by IND, that ¬(aiIbi) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If k = 1, we know that a1Pb1 ⇒ ~a  ~b. If k > 1, we need to
prove, without loss of generality, the following two cases:
1. For all x ∈ max{~a}, y ∈ max{~b}, xPy. Consider, first, that |max{~a}| =
1 and L(γ1(~a)) = k. Select x 6∈ ~a such that akPx, the existence of which
is guaranteed. Then, we construct the set ~a
′
= (a1, . . . , ak−1, x). Now,
by applying HOS to sets ~a
′
and ~b, we find that there exists y 6∈ ~a′ such
that (a1, . . . , ak−1, y)  ~b. Now, if akRy, we can apply RES, which is
weaker than IND (see Section 4) and which gives us ~a % (a1, . . . , ak−1, y).
Transitivity allows us to conclude that ~a  ~b. If yPak, then, by NEU
and transitivity, ~a  ~b. If |max{~a}| = 1 and L(γ1(~a)) = i < k, we have,
by Lemma ??, that REO can be applied to give ~a  Π(i,k)(~a). Now,
by applying the previous reasoning to Π(i,k)(~a) and ~b, we obtain that
Π(i,k)(~a)  ~b. Transitivity allows us to conclude that ~a  ~b. If, on the
other hand, |max{~a}| > 1, let j = L(γ1(~a)) and let T ⊂ {1, . . . , k} be
such that i ∈ T ⇔ ai /∈ max{~a}. Then, we construct the set ~a′′ such
that ai = a
′′
i for all i ∈ T∪{j} and aiPa′′i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}\(T∪{j}).
By RES, ~a  ~a′′ . Given that |max{~a′′}| = 1, we can apply the previous
reasoning to obtain ~a
′′  ~b. By transitivity ~a  ~b.
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2. For all x ∈ max{~a}, y ∈ max{~b}, xIy, with L(γ1(~a)) = i < L(γ1(~b)).
Consider the actions (a1, . . . , ai), (b1, . . . , bi) ∈ Qi. We can apply Case 1,
which gives us (a1, . . . , ai)  (b1, . . . , bi). We know, by WLS1, that there
exists ~c ∈ Q such that (a1, . . . , ai,~c, ai+1)  (b1, . . . , bi,~c, bi+1). Then, by
applying IND |~c|-times, we find that (a1, . . . , ai, ai+1)  (b1, . . . , bi, bi+1).
By repeating this process (k − i)-times, we obtain ~a  ~b.
Therefore, %=%LD.
Proof of Theorem ??
The necessary part is straightforward. To prove the sufficient part, take ~a,~b ∈
Qk. If aiIbi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then, by the Extension assumption on
% we have that (a1) ∼ (b1). Then, by successive applications of IND we
obtain ~a ∼ ~b. In other case, we can assume, by IND, that ¬(aiIbi) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If k = 1, we know that a1Pb1 ⇒ ~a  ~b. If k > 1, we need to
prove, without loss of generality, the following two cases:
1. For all x ∈ min{~a}, y ∈ min{~b}, xPy. Consider, first, that |min{~b}| = 1
and L(β1(~b)) = k. Select x 6∈ ~b such that xPbk, the existence of which is
guaranteed. Then, we construct the action ~b
′
= (b1, . . . , bk−1, x). Now,
by applying LOS to actions ~a and ~b
′
, we find that there exists y 6∈ ~b′
such that ~a  (b1, . . . , bk−1, y). Now, if yRbk, we can apply RES, which
is weaker than IND and which gives us (b1, . . . , bk−1, y) % ~b. Transitivity
allows us to conclude that ~a  ~b. If bkPy, then, by NEU and transitivity,
~a  ~b. If |min{~b}| = 1 and L(β1(~b)) = i < k, we have, by Lemma
??, that REO can be applied to give Π(i,k)(~b)  ~b. Now, by applying
the previous reasoning to ~a and Π(i,k)(~b), we obtain that ~a  Π(i,k)(~b).
Transitivity allows us to conclude that ~a  ~b. If, on the other hand,
|min{~b}| > 1, let j = L(β1(~b)) and let T ⊂ {1, . . . , k} be such that
i ∈ T ⇔ bi /∈ min{~b}. Then, we construct the set ~b′′ such that bi = b′′i
for all i ∈ T ∪ {j} and b′′i Pbi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ (T ∪ {j}). By RES,
~b
′′  ~b. Given that |min{~b′′}| = 1, we can apply the previous reasoning
to obtain ~a  ~b′′ . By transitivity, ~a  ~b.
2. For all x ∈ min{~a}, y ∈ min{~b}, xIy, with L(β1(~a)) = i > L(β1(~b)).
Consider the actions (a1, . . . , ai), (b1, . . . , bi) ∈ Qi. We can apply Case 1,
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which gives us (a1, . . . , ai)  (b1, . . . , bi). We know, by WLS2, that there
exists ~c ∈ Q such that (a1, . . . , ai,~c, ai+1)  (b1, . . . , bi,~c, bi+1). Then, by
applying IND |~c|-times, we find that (a1, . . . , ai, ai+1)  (b1, . . . , bi, bi+1).
By repeating this process (k − i)-times, we obtain ~a  ~b.
Therefore, %=%ld.
Proof of Proposition ??
We will now define some rankings on
⋃
k∈N(Qk×Qk) to show the independence
of the collections of axioms used in the different characterization theorems of
Section 3.1.
1. Independence of IND and LS.
• Let %1∈
⋃
k∈N(Qk ×Qk) be such that for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N,
~a %1 ~b⇔ a1Rb1. Then, %1 satisfies LS, but it does not satisfy IND.
• %LD satisfies IND, but it does not satisfy LS.
2. Independence of IND, NEU, WLS1 and HOS.
• Let %2∈
⋃
k∈N(Qk ×Qk) be such that for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N,
~a %2 ~b⇔ [γ1(~a)Pγ1(~b) or (γ1(~a)Iγ1(~b) and L(γ1(~a)) ≤ L(γ1(~b)))].
Then, %2 satisfies NEU, WLS1 and HOS, but not IND.
• Consider a utility function u that represents R, any x, y ∈ X, with
x 6= y, and a non-decreasing real-valued function, f , such that f(u(x)) =
f(u(y)) and such that it is strictly increasing outside the interval be-
tween u(x) and u(y). We denote by pi(~a) a permutation of the outcomes
in ~a such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, f(u(pii(~a))) > f(u(pii+1(~a)))
or f(u(pii(~a))) = f(u(pii+1(~a))) and L(pii(~a)) < L(pii+1(~a)), where pii(~a)
denotes the element of ~a that occupies the i-th position after the per-
mutation.
Let %3∈
⋃
k∈N(Qk ×Qk) be such that for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N,
~a %3 ~b⇔ there is j ≤ k such that:
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for all i ≤ j, [f(u(pii(~a))) = f(u(pii(~b))) and L(pii(~a)) = L(pii(~b))] and
− If j < k, [f(u(pij(~a))) > f(u(pij(~b))) or (f(u(pij(~a))) = f(u(pij(~b)))
and L(pij(~a)) < L(pij(~b))
)]
.
− If j = k, ~a %LD ~b.
Then, %3 satisfies IND, WLS1 and HOS, but not NEU.
• Let %4∈
⋃
k∈N(Qk ×Qk) be such that for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N,
~a %4 ~b⇔ there is not j ≤ k such that for all i <
j, γi(~b)Iγi(~a) and γj(~b)Pγj(~a).
Then, %4 satisfies IND, NEU and HOS, but not WLS1.
• %LL satisfies IND, NEU and WLS1, but not HOS.
3. Independence of IND, NEU, WLS2 and LOS. The proof is analogous to
that of item 2. The kind of rules that enable us to prove the indepen-
dence of each axiom are dual to those used in item 2.
Proof of Theorem ??
We have that IND and LS imply the desired result for all comparisons when
the sets are of the same cardinality (see Theorem ??). For the remaining
comparisons, take ~a ∈ Qk and ~b ∈ Qm, with k < m. We have to prove the
following cases:
1. (b1, . . . , bk) LL ~a. Then, the richness assumption enables us to select
y1, . . . , ym−k ∈ X such that ym−kPym−k−1P . . . Py1Pγ1(~a). By applying
DOM, we find that (~a, y1)  ~a. By another application of DOM we
find that (~a, y1, y2)  (~a, y1). Successive applications of this process and
transitivity show that (~a, y1, . . . , ym−k)  ~a. Note that (~a, y1, . . . , ym−k)
and ~b have the same cardinality. Then, by Theorem ??, we know that
~b  (~a, y1, . . . , ym−k) and, by transitivity, ~b  ~a.
2. (b1, . . . , bk) ∼LL ~a and bjPbi for all j > k and i ≤ k. Then, the
richness assumption enables us to select z1, . . . , zm−k ∈ X such that
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γ1(~b)Pzm−kP . . . Pz1Pγ1(~a). Then, by applying DOM and transitivity,
as in item 1, we find that (~a, z1, . . . zm−k)  ~a. Note that (~a, z1, . . . ,
zm−k) and ~b have the same cardinality. Then, by Theorem ??, we know
that ~b  (~a, z1, . . . , zm−k) and, by transitivity, ~b  ~a.
3. ~a LL (b1, . . . , bk). Then, by the richness assumption, we can select
x1, . . . , xm−k ∈ X such that β1(~a)Px1P . . . Pxm−k. By applying DOM,
we find that ~a  (~a, x1). By another application of DOM, we find that
(~a, x1)  (~a, x1, x2). Successive applications of this process and transi-
tivity show that ~a  (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k). Note that (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k) and ~b
have the same cardinality. By Theorem ??, we know that (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k)
 ~b, and by transitivity, ~a  ~b.
4. (b1, . . . , bk) ∼LL ~a and biPbj for all i ≤ k and j > k. Then, the
richness assumption enables us to select w1, . . . , wm−k ∈ X such that
β1(~a)Pw1P . . . Pwm−kPγk+1(~b). Then, by applying DOM and transi-
tivity, as in item 1, we find that ~a  (~a, w1, . . . wm−k). Note that
(~a, w1, . . . , wm−k) and ~b have the same cardinality. Then, by Theorem
??, we know that (~a, w1, . . . , wm−k)  ~b and, by transitivity, ~a  ~b.
5. aiIbj for all i, j ≤ |~a| and γ1(~b)Pβ1(~b)Iγ1(~a). If bjPbi for all j > k
and i ≤ k, case 2 applies. If not, let t be the highest integer such
that β1(~b)Iβt(~b). Observe that k < t < m. Consider t − k outcomes
w1, . . . , wt−k ∈ (X \ ~a) such that wiIβ1(~b) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t − k},
which always exist by definition of t. Then, by DOM and transitivity,
we have that ~a ∼ (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k). On the other hand, consider β(~b) =
(β1(~b), . . . , βm(~b)). By Lemma ??, we can apply REO to obtain that ~b 
β(~b). Now, by the richness assumption, consider v1, . . . , vm−t ∈ X such
that βt+1(~b)Pvm−tP . . . Pv1Pβ1(~b). Successive applications of DOM and
transitivity leads to (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k, v1, . . . , vm−t)  (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k).
Note that (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k, v1, . . . , vm−t) and β(~b) have the same cardi-
nality and, therefore, Theorem ?? can be applied to obtain that β(~b) 
(~a, w1, . . . , wt−k, v1, . . . , vm−t). Transitivity concludes that ~b  ~a.
6. aiIbj for all i, j ≤ |~a| and γ1(~a)Iγ1(~b)Pβ1(~b). If biPbj for all i ≤
k and j > k, then case 4 applies. Otherwise, let t be the highest
integer such that γ1(~b)Iγt(~b). Observe that k < t < m. Consider
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t − k outcomes w1, . . . , wt−k ∈ (X \ ~a) such that wiIγ1(~b) for all i ∈
{1, . . . , t − k} that always exist by definition of t. Then, by DOM
and transitivity, we have that ~a ∼ (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k). On the other
hand, consider γ(~b) = (γ1(~b), . . . , γm(~b)). By Lemma ??, we can ap-
ply REO to obtain that γ(~b)  ~b. Now, by the richness assumption,
consider v1, . . . , vm−t ∈ X such that γ1(~b)Pv1P . . . Pvm−tPγt+1(~b). Suc-
cessive applications of DOM and transitivity leads to (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k) 
(~a, w1, . . . , wt−k, v1, . . . , vm−t). Note that (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k, v1, . . . , vm−t)
and γ(~b) have the same cardinality and, therefore, Theorem ?? can be
applied to obtain that (~a, w1, . . . , wt−k, v1, . . . , vm−t)  γ(~b). Transitiv-
ity concludes that ~a  ~b.
7. aiIbj for all ai ∈ ~a and bj ∈ ~b. By Theorem ??, we know that (b1, . . . , bk) ∼
~a. Now, by successive applications of DOM and transitivity, ~b ∼ (b1, . . . ,
bk). Transitivity concludes that ~a ∼ ~b.
8. It is not difficult to check that the remaining comparisons are not uni-
vocally determined by our axioms.
Therefore, %∈%eLL.
Proof of Theorem ??
We have that IND, NEU, WLS1 and HOS imply the result for all comparisons
of sets having the same cardinality (see Theorem ??). For the remaining
comparisons, take ~a ∈ Qk and ~b ∈ Qm, with k < m. We have to prove the
following cases:
1. γ1(~b)Pγ1(~a). Then, making use of the richness assumption, take x1, . . . ,
xm−k ∈ X such that γ1(~b)Pxm−kP . . . Px1Pγ1(~a). Application of DOM
shows that (~a, x1)  ~a. Repeated application of DOM, as in the proof of
Theorem ??, shows that (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k)  ~a. Note that (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k)
and ~b have the same cardinality. Then, by the result of Theorem ??, we
know that ~b  (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k), and by transitivity, ~b  ~a.
2. β1(~b)Iγ1(~a)Pβ1(~a). If γ1(~b)Pβ1(~b), case 1 applies. Then, we only have
to prove the case in which γ1(~b)Iβ1(~b) and, therefore, biIbj for all i, j ∈
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{1, . . . ,m}. By Theorem ??, we know that (b1, . . . , bk)  ~a. By suc-
cessive applications of DOM and transitivity, ~b ∼ (b1, . . . , bk). Finally,
transitivity concludes that ~b  ~a.
3. there is j ≤ k such that for all i < j, [γi(~a)Iγi(~b) and L(γi(~a)) =
L(γi(~b))
]
and
[
γ∗j (~a)Pγj(~b) or
(
γj(~a)Iγj(~b) and L(γj(~a)) < L(γj(~b))
)]
.
Then, by the richness assumption, consider y1, . . . , ym−k ∈ X such that
β1(~a)Py1P . . . Pym−k. Successive applications of DOM and transitivity,
as in item 1, shows that ~a  (~a, y1, . . . , ym−k). Again, (~a, y1, . . . , ym−k)
and ~b have the same cardinality and, therefore, Theorem ?? can be
applied to obtain that (~a, y1, . . . , ym−k)  ~b. Transitivity allows us to
conclude that ~a  ~b.
4. aiIbi for all i ≤ k and β1(~a)Pγk+1(~b). Then, by the richness assump-
tion, consider z1, . . . , zm−k ∈ X such that β1(~a)Pz1P . . . Pzm−kPγk+1(~b).
Successive applications of DOM and transitivity, as in item 1, shows
that ~a  (~a, z1, . . . , zm−k). Again, (~a, z1, . . . , zm−k) and ~b have the same
cardinality and, therefore, Theorem ?? can be applied to show that
(~a, z1, . . . , zm−k)  ~b. Transitivity allows us to conclude that ~a  ~b.
5. aiIbi for all i ≤ k and γ1(~a)Iβ1(~a)Iγ1(~b)Pβ1(~b). If β1(~a)Pγk+1(~b),
then case 4 applies. Otherwise, let t be the highest integer such that
γ1(~b)Iγt(~b). Now, consider v1, . . . , vt−k ∈ (X \ ~a) such that viIγ1(~b),
whose existence is guaranteed by the definition of t. Now, by DOM and
transitivity, we can conclude that ~a ∼ (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k). Then, by the
richness assumption, consider w1, . . . , wm−t ∈ X such that γ1(~b)Pw1P
. . . Pwm−tPγt+1(~b). Successive applications of DOM and transitivity
leads to (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k)  (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k, w1, . . . , wm−t). Note that
(~a, v1, . . . , vt−k, w1, . . . , wm−t and ~b have the same cardinality and, there-
fore, Theorem ?? can be applied to obtain that (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k, w1, . . . ,
wm−k)  ~b. Transitivity concludes that ~a  ~b.
6. aiIbj for all ai ∈ ~a and bj ∈ ~b. By Theorem ??, we know that (b1, . . . , bk) ∼
~a. Now, by successive applications of DOM and transitivity, ~b ∼ (b1, . . . ,
bk). Transitivity concludes that ~a ∼ ~b.
7. It is not difficult to check that the remaining comparisons are not uni-
vocally determined by our axioms.
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Therefore, %∈%eLD
Proof of Theorem ??
We have that IND, NEU, WLS2 and LOS imply the result for all comparisons
of sets having the same cardinality (see Theorem ??). For the remaining
comparisons, take ~a ∈ Qk and ~b ∈ Qm, with k < m. We have to prove the
following cases:
1. β1(~a)Pβ1(~b). Then, by the richness assumption, we can select x1, . . . ,
xm−k ∈ X such that β1(~a)Px1P . . . Pxm−kPβ1(~b). By successive appli-
cations of DOM and transitivity, we have that ~a  (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k).
Now, Theorem ?? can be applied to obtain (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k)  ~b. Tran-
sitivity allows us to conclude that ~a  ~b.
2. γ1(~a)Pβ1(~a)Iγ1(~b). If γ1(~b)Pβ1(~b), case 1 applies. Then, we only have
to prove the case in which γ1(~b)Iβ1(~b) and, therefore, biIbj for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}. By Theorem ??, we know that ~a  (b1, . . . , bk). By suc-
cessive applications of DOM and transitivity, ~b ∼ (b1, . . . , bk). Finally,
transitivity concludes that ~a  ~b.
3. there is j ≤ k such that for all i < j, [βi(~b)Iβi(~a) and L(βi(~b)) =
L(βi(~a))
]
and
[
βj(~b)Pβj(~a) or
(
βj(~b)Iβj(~a) and L(βj(~b)) > L(βj(~a))
)]
.
Then, by the richness assumption, consider x1, . . . , xm−k ∈ X such that
xm−kP . . . Px1Pγ1(~a). As before, the successive application of DOM
and transitivity lead to (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k)  ~a. Now, by Theorem ??,
~b  (~a, x1, . . . , xm−k). Transitivity allows us to conclude that ~b  ~a.
4. If aiIbi for all i ≤ k and βk+1(~b)Pγ1(~a). Then, by the richness assump-
tion, consider z1, . . . , zm−k ∈ X such that βk+1(~b)Pzm−kP . . . Pz1Pγ1(~a).
Successive applications of DOM and transitivity shows that (~a, z1, . . . ,
zm−k)  ~a. Again, (~a, z1, . . . , zm−k) and ~b have the same cardinality and,
therefore, Theorem ?? can be applied to show that ~b  (~a, z1, . . . , zm−k).
Transitivity allows us to conclude that ~b  ~a.
5. aiIbi for all i ≤ k and γ1(~b)Pβ1(~b)Iγ1(~a)Iβ1(~a). If bjPbi for all j > k
and i ≤ k, case 4 applies. Otherwise, let t be the highest integer
such that β1(~b)Iβt(~b). Now, consider v1, . . . , vt−k ∈ (X \ ~a) such that
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viIβ1(~b), whose existence is guaranteed by the definition of t. Now,
by DOM and transitivity, we can conclude that ~a ∼ (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k).
Then, consider, by the richness assumption, w1, . . . , wm−t ∈ X such that
βt+1(~b)Pwm−tP . . . Pw1Pβ1(~b). Successive applications of DOM and
transitivity leads to (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k, w1, . . . , wm−t)  (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k).
Note that (~a, v1, . . . , vt−k, w1, . . . , wm−t) and ~b have the same cardinality
and, therefore, Theorem ?? can be applied to obtain that ~b  (~a, v1, . . . ,
vt−k, w1, . . . , wm−t). Transitivity concludes that ~b  ~a.
6. aiIbj for all ai ∈ ~a and bj ∈ ~b. By Theorem ??, we know that (b1, . . . , bk) ∼
~a. Now, by successive applications of DOM and transitivity, ~b ∼ (b1, . . . ,
bk). Transitivity concludes that ~a ∼ ~b.
7. It is not difficult to check that the remaining comparisons are not uni-
vocally determined by our axioms.
Therefore, %∈%eld.
Proof of Theorem ??
Let us assume that % satisfies RES, REO, RO, EU and DOM. First, we are
going to prove that actions with the same cardinality must be compared using
a weighted average of the utilities of their possible results. This proof can
be carried out following the same steps as described in the proof of Theorem
4.5 in Hammond [?], which, in turn, is a development of the proof provided
by Anscombe and Aumann [?]. It is only necessary to note that we can
assimilate the states of nature in his model with the likelihood positions in
our model. Taking this into account, the parallelisms between Hammond’s
axiom structure and ours are the following: (i) his axiom Ordering (O) is
equivalent to our assumption that % is a complete preorder; (ii) his axioms of
Independence (I) and Continuity (C) are implied by EU; (iii) our RO axiom is
an exact transfer to our domain of Hammond’s axiom of the same name; (iv)
his axiom of State Independence (SI) ensures that the individual preference is
the same across all states of nature, while RES implies the same thing in our
domain, except that it refers to positions instead of states of nature; and (v)
his axiom of Sure Thing Principle (STP) is implied, as proved in Lemma 4.1
in Hammond [?], by O, RO and Strong Independence (I*), a property implied
by EU.
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Then, taking into account our assumption that all indifference classes on
X are infinite, we can apply the reasoning presented in the proof of Theorem
4.5 in Hammond [?]. Thus, we find that there exists u : X → R and for
each k ∈ N, there exists ωk = (ωk1 , . . . , ωkk) ∈ Rk++ such that for all ~a,~b ∈ Qk,
~a % ~b⇔
k∑
i=1
ωki · u(ai) ≥
k∑
i=1
ωki · u(bi).
We find that REO implies that ωki > ω
k
i+1 for all k ∈ N and all i ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1} (condition (i) in the statement of the theorem). We now need
to prove that the weights also satisfy conditions (ii) and (iii). On the one
hand, by DOM we have that any pair of actions having different cardinality are
indifferent if all their outcomes are indifferent. Then, the sum of the weights
must be the same for different cardinality values. Therefore, condition (ii)
is satisfied, given that we can normalize this sum to 1. As for condition
(iii), let us suppose that it is not true and, therefore, that the corresponding
restrictions on the weights do not hold. Then, consider the weights associated
with dimension k, a subset T ⊆ {1, . . . , k} and a value s violating condition
(iii). Consider, by the assumption of richness and the assumption that all
indifference classes are infinite, two actions ~a ∈ Qk, ~b ∈ Qk+1 such that: (a) ~b
consists of the insertion of outcome x into position s ∈ {1, . . . , k} of action ~a,
(b) the utility values of the outcomes occupying the positions in T of action ~a
are of a specific exact value u¯, (c) the utilities of the remaining outcomes of ~a
are of a specific exact value uˆ, with u¯ > uˆ, and (d) u(x) = u¯ + ε, with ε > 0
arbitrarily small.
Then, by DOM and REO, we should have that ~b  ~a. On the other hand,
by construction,
k∑
i=1
ωki ·u(ai) = (
∑
i∈T
ωki )·u¯+(1−
∑
i∈T
ωki )·uˆ and
k+1∑
i=1
ωk+1i ·u(bi) is
arbitrarily close to (
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i )·u¯+(1−
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i )·uˆ. However,
if
∑
i∈T
ωki >
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i , it is possible that
k∑
i=1
ωki · u(ai) ≥
k+1∑
i=1
ωk+1i · u(bi)
and, therefore, ~a % ~b, which leads to a contradiction.
Let us now assume that % is a weighted likelihood criteria with the re-
striction on the weights stated in the theorem. First, it is easy to see that
% satisfies RES and REO. In order to check that it also satisfies DOM, con-
sider any action ~a ∈ Qk for any k ∈ N and an outcome x 6∈ ~a such that
u(x) > u(γ1(~a)). Consider a new action ~b that consists of the insertion of x in
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position s ∈ {1, . . . , k} of action ~a. We have to prove that ~b  ~a.
We will start by proving that the following equation holds for any set of
positions T = {L(γ1(~a)), . . . , L(γt(~a))} for all t ∈ {1, . . . , k}:∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i ·u(bi)−
∑
i∈T
ωki ·u(ai) > u(γt(~a))·
( ∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈T
ωki
)
.
(1)
We will proceed inductively on t. Take t = 1. Then, T = {L(γ1(~a))}.
First, we have that
u(γ1(~a))·
( ∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −ωkL(γ1(~a))
)
=
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i ·u(γ1(~a))−ωkL(γ1(~a))·u(γ1(~a)).
On the other hand, given that u(x) > u(γ1(~a)), we have that∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i · u(bi) >
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i · u(γ1(~a)).
Then, (??) holds for t = 1.
Now suppose we have proved (??) for a value p. Let us denote T =
{L(γ1(~a)), . . . , L(γp(~a))} and S = (T ∪ {L(γp+1(~a))}). In this case, the left-
hand side of Equation ??∑
i∈S−s∪S∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i · u(bi)−
∑
i∈S
ωki · u(ai)
can be broken down into the addition of the following two terms:∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i ·u(bi)−
∑
i∈T
ωki ·u(ai) and u(γp+1(~a))·
(
ωk+1L(γp+1(~a))−ωkL(γp+1(~a))
)
.
Given the induction hypothesis, we know that the first term satisfies:∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i ·u(bi)−
∑
i∈T
ωki ·u(ai) > u(γp(~a))·
( ∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈T
ωki
)
.
Then, we have that ∑
i∈S−s∪S∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i · u(bi)−
∑
i∈S
ωki · u(ai) >
36
u(γp(~a)) ·
( ∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈T
ωki
)
+ u(γp+1(~a)) ·
(
ωk+1L(γp+1(~a)) − ωkL(γp+1(~a))
)
.
We also know by the condition on the weights assumed in the theorem
that (
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈T
ωki ) ≥ 0. Then, given that u(γp(~a)) > u(γp+1(~a)),
u(γp(~a))·
( ∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈T
ωki
) ≥ u(γp+1(~a))·( ∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈T
ωki
)
.
Therefore, ∑
i∈S−s∪S∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i · u(bi)−
∑
i∈S
ωki · u(ai) >
u(γp+1(~a))·
( ∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈T
ωki
)
+u(γp+1(~a))·
(
ωk+1L(γp+1(~a))−ωkL(γp+1(~a))
)
=
u(γp+1(~a)) ·
( ∑
i∈S−s∪S∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i −
∑
i∈S
ωki
)
.
Then, (??) holds for every t ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In particular, when t = k,∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i =
k+1∑
i=1
ωk+1i =
∑
i∈T
ωki =
k∑
i=1
ωki = 1. Then, the right-hand side
of (??) equals to 0. Therefore,
∑
i∈T−s∪T ∗+s∪{s}
ωk+1i · u(bi) =
k+1∑
i=1
ωk+1i · u(bi) >
∑
i∈T
ωki · u(ai) =
k∑
i=1
ωki · u(ai). Thus, ~b  ~a.
The proof that when u(x) < u(β1(~a)), then ~a  ~b is analogous. Finally,
the proof that when u(x) = u(γ1(~a)) = u(β1(~a)), then ~a ∼ ~b is straightforward
given condition (ii) on the weights. Then, the proof is finished.
Examples of rules in the extended families
We provide four rules that belong to each of the extended families character-
ized in Theorems ??, ??, ?? and ??. For that purpose we define Q∗ as the set
of all possible non-empty vectors that can be constructed with the elements
of X. (Note that the difference between Q∗ and Q is that the former domain
allows to repeat elements of X).
• Theorem ??: Consider %1∈%eLL, which compares any two actions ~a,~b ∈
Q such that |~a| < |~b| as follows:
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~a %1 ~b⇔ (~a)∗|~b| %∗LL ~b,
where (~a)∗|~b| = (~a, β1(~a),
|~b|−|~a|. . . , β1(~a)) and %∗LL compares the elements of
Q∗ in the same way as %LL compares the elements of Q.
• Theorem ??: Consider %2∈%eLD, which compares any two actions ~a,~b ∈
Q such that |~a| < |~b| as follows:
~a %2 ~b⇔ (~a)∗|~b| %∗LD ~b,
where (~a)∗|~b| = (~a, β1(~a),
|~b|−|~a|. . . , β1(~a)) and %∗LD compares the elements of
Q∗ in the same way as %LD compares the elements of Q.
• Theorem ??:
Consider %3∈%eld, which compares any two actions ~a,~b ∈ Q such that
|~a| < |~b| as follows:
~a %3 ~b⇔ (~a)∗|~b| %∗ld ~b,
where (~a)∗|~b| = (~a, γ1(~a),
|~b|−|~a|. . . , γ1(~a)) and %∗ld compares the elements of
Q∗ in the same way as %ld compares the elements of Q.
• Theorem ??: We denote by bxc the lowest integer part of x. Then,
consider the criterion %4∈ Ω associated with an arbitrarily high positive
number M such that ωki =
1
k
+ (bk
2
c − i+ 1) · εk, when i < k+12 ; ωki = 1k ,
when i = k+1
2
; and ωki =
1
k
− (i − bk+1
2
c) · εk, when i > k+12 , with
εk =
1
M ·k·b k+1
2
c .
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